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Eisenberg: The Hollings Bill: Unconstitutional Under the First Amendment

THE HOLLINGS BILL: UNCONSTITUTIONAL
UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Arthur Eisenberg*
As Mr. Windhausen suggested,' there are a variety of legislative
proposals that have surfaced with respect to the issue of television
and violence. Two of the proposals, the Hollings Bill 2 and the Bryant
BilP would call upon the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") directly to regulate the content of programming. Three bills,
the Schumer Bill,4 the Kennedy Bill,5 and the Dorgan-Durbin Bil
would, in a variety of ways, call upon government agencies to collect
information and to publicize information about violent programming.
Two other pieces of legislation, the Durenberger Bill7 and the
Slattery-Kassebaum Resolution' would compel television licensees to
engage in the labeling of television programming. And, one bill, the
Markey Bill,9 is directed at the television manufacturers and seeks to
compel them to build television sets equipped with television blocking

* Chief Staff Counsel, New York Civil Liberties Union. Editor's note: This article was
originally presented at a live Symposium on Television and Violence held at Hofstra University School of Law on April 8, 1994.
1. See John Windhausen, Congressional Interest in the Problem of Television and Violence, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 783 (1994).
2. S. 1383, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
3. H.R. 2837, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
4. H.R. 2609, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
5. H.R. 2756, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
6. S. 973, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H.R. 2159, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
7. S. 943, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
8. S. Res. 122, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); H. Res. 202, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993).
9. H.R. 2888, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The Markey Bill would require manufacturers to equip television sets with two forms of blocking devices. First, manufacturers would
be required to build television sets with the capacity to block out a particular channel so that
a parent could simply trigger the blocking device and thereby prevent children from viewing
channels that in the parents' opinion contain programming that is inappropriate to children.
Second, the Markey Bill would also require manufacturers to build televisions with a
chip that would recognize and block or scramble a particular signal. If such a requirement
were implemented, an "enlightened" television program producer, upon acknowledging that his
or her television show contains violence, could include on the videotape of the program, a
particular signal which could then be identified by the chip and the program could be scrambled or blocked.
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devices.
But, because the Hollings Bill represents, in many respects, perhaps the most aggressive effort by Congress to control the content of
television programming, let me focus first on that bill and explain
why I believe it is unconstitutional."0 Indeed, I believe it is unconsti10. The text of the Hollings Bill is as follows:
SECTION 1 SHORT TITLE
This act may be cited as the "Children's Protection from Violent Programming Act of 1993."
SECTION 2 FINDINGS
The Congress Makes the following findings:
(1) Television influences children's perception of the values and behavior
that are common and acceptable in society.
(2) Television station operators, cable television system operators, and video
programmers should follow practices in connection with video programming that
take into consideration that television broadcast and cable prograrmning(A) has established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all
Americans; and
(B) is readily accessible to children.
(3) Violent video programming influences children, as does indecent programming.
(4) There is empirical evidence that children exposed to violent video programming at a young age have a higher tendency for violent and aggressive behavior later in life than those children not so exposed. Children exposed to violent
video programming are prone to assume that acts of violence are acceptable behavior and therefore to imitate such behavior.
(5) There is a compelling governmental interest in limiting the negative
influences of violent video programming on children.
(6) There is a compelling governmental interest in channeling programming
with violent content to periods of the day when children are not likely to comprise
a substantial portion of the television audience.
(7) Restricting the hours when violent video programming is shown is the
least restrictive and most narrowly tailored means to achieve that compelling governmental interest.
(8) Warning labels about the violent content of video programming will not
in themselves prevent children from watching violent video programming.
SECTION 3 UNLAWFUL DISTRIBUTION OF VIOLENT PROGRAMMING
Title VII of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. § 601 et seq.) is
amended by adding at the end the following new section:
SEC. 714 UNLAWFUL DISTRIBUTION OF VIOLENT PROGRAMMING
(a) UNLAWFUL DISTRIBUTION-It shall be unlawful for any person
to-

(1) distribute to the public any violent video programming
during hours when children are reasonably likely to comprise a substantial portion
of the audience; or
(2) knowingly produce or provide material for such distribution.
(b) RuLEMAKING PROCEEDING-The Commission shall conduct a
rulemaking proceeding to implement the provisions of this section and shall promulgate final regulations pursuant to that proceeding not later than nine months
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tutional under two discrete First Amendment doctrines. First, the
Hollings Bill violates First Amendment vagueness principles. Where
First Amendment rights are at stake, government is required to regu-

late with narrow specificity." Precise regulation is important for two
basic reasons. First there is the underlying due process notice principle that generally requires government to regulate in a way that informs individuals as to what kind of conduct is prohibited and what
kind of conduct is not prohibited. But, where free speech is at stake,
we require an even greater degree of regulatory precision. We do so
because we do not want citizens to err on the side of self-censorship.
The second reason for requiring precision of regulation is that

after the date of enactment of this section. As part of that proceeding, the Commission(1) may exempt from the prohibition under subsection (a)
programming (including news programs, documentaries, educational programs, and
sporting events) whose distribution does not conflict with objective of protecting
children from the negative influences of violent video programming, as that objective is reflected in section 2 of the Children's Protection from Violent Programming Act of 1993;
(2) shall define the term "hours when children are reasonably
likely to comprise a substantial portion of the audience" and the term "violent
video programming."
(c) REPEAT VIOLATIONS-If a person repeatedly violates this section
or any regulation promulgated under this section, the Commission shall, after notice
and opportunity for hearing, immediately repeal any license issued to that person
under this Act.
(d) CONSIDERATION OF VIOLATIONS IN LICENSE RENEWALS-Tbe
Commission shall consider, among the elements in its review of an application for
renewal of a license under this Act, whether the licensee has complied with this
section and the regulations promulgated under this section.
(e) DEFINmON-As used in this section, the term "distribute!'
means to send, transmit, retransmit, telecast, broadcast or cablecast, including by
wire, microwave or satellite.
SECTION 4 EFFECrIVE DATE
The prohibition contained in § 714 of the Communications Act of 1934 (as
added by section 3 of this Act) and the regulations promulgated thereunder shall
be effective on the date that is one year after the date of enactment of this Act.
Id.
11. The Supreme Court has repeatedly observed that "[p]recision of regulation must be
the touchstone" whenever First Amendment rights are involved. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 438 (1963). Basic due process principles dictate that citizens must be given fair warning
of what is and is not prohibited by our criminal laws. Nevertheless, some uncertainty inevitably remains and citizens are left to calculate whether their behavior violates the law. Where
First Amendment activity is involved, we seek to alter the calculus somewhat because we do
not want citizens to engage in self-censorship out of fear that their expressive activity will
run afoul of the law. Accordingly, we insist on even greater specificity with respect to laws
that regulate expressive activity than we do with regard to general criminal enactments. See
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
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imprecise laws confer excessive discretion on public officials who are
charged with enforcing the law. Such discretion provides regulators
with the capacity to favor some speakers over others based upon the
content of their expression, thus violating one of the most basic principles of the First Amendment: the principle that requires government
neutrality with respect to the speechmaking activity of its citizens and
that prohibits content-based discrimination by government officials.12
I think the Hollings Bill fails ultimately to satisfy the First
Amendment requirement of precise regulation. By its terms, the
Hollings Bill seeks to regulate "violent video programming."' But
the statute, at least, does not define this term. It presumably leaves to
the FCC the authority to engage in that definitional effort. But that
definitional effort, I suspect, will ultimately be unsuccessful. It does
not seem at all likely that a satisfactory definition can be developed.
How, indeed, is violent television programming to be defined?
Would Tom and Jerry cartoons qualify as violent? A survey of television violence conducted at Concordia College in Minnesota 4 found
that seventy-three acts of violence on a Tom and Jerry cartoon took
place in one hour; in Bugs Bunny they found fifty-eight acts of violence in a one-hour program. Nineteen acts of violence were found in
The Little Mermaid. Would these cartoons be defined as violent video
programming?
The same Concordia College study found twenty-one acts of
violence in a documentary on the Civil War. Twelve acts of violence
were found by the survey in the Hitchcock film, North by Northwest.
Are these shows so violent as to be relegated to some distant hour,
late at night? Are children not to be permitted to watch TV documentaries?
Now, I understand the Hollings Bill allows that the FCC might,
in its discretion, choose to exclude documentaries from the reach of
its provisions. Nevertheless, I raise these matters simply to demonstrate the difficulty that I think the FCC will inevitably encounter in
attempting to define the sort of violence that would fall within the
proscriptive reach of its regulatory authority.
What about news? Is 'the federal government's invasion of the
Branch Davidian complex so violent that it should not be shown to
children? What about football games? Should football games not be

12. See, e.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974).
13. S. 1383, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
14. TELEVISION VIOLENCE DEMONSTRATION PROCT (Concordia College 1993).
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shown on Sunday afternoons because-applying the statutory standard-a substantial number of children might be watching? Again, the
legislation allows that sporting events and news might be excluded in
the discretion of the FCC, but again, the statute makes no effort to
define what violence would be covered.
Thus, violence remains a highly subjective matter and it is unlikely in the extreme, that any satisfactory definition can be employed
which will give broadcasters fair and sufficient notice as to what is
and what is not proscribed in a way that will satisfy the First
Amendment requirement of precise regulatory enactments. Indeed,
there is a case almost directly on point. 5 In 1991, the State of Missouri enacted a law prohibiting the sale or rental of videocassettes to
minors if they depicted violence. The Eighth Circuit found the statute
to be hopelessly vague and therefore unconstitutional. 6 Under the
reasoning of the Eighth Circuit, the Hollings Bill would be similarly
unconstitutional.
The Hollings Bill also violates the First Amendment prohibition
against content-based regulation. As Justice Marshall observed in
Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 7 "above all else, the First

Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.""8 Accordingly, the First Amendment requires that any contentbased regulation must be shown to be narrowly tailored in the pursuit
of a compelling governmental interest.
Now, I would concede that the prevention of violent acts by
children is a compelling governmental interest, but the fact remains
that the Hollings Bill is not narrowly tailored in the pursuit of that
interest. The case law suggests that an unsubstantiated fear of violence or similar bad behavior cannot serve as a basis for suppressing
speech. 9 Consequently, in Brandenburg v. Ohio,2' the Supreme

15. Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Webster, 968 F.2d 684 (8th Cir. 1992).
16. Id. at 689.
17. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
18. Id. at 95.
19. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Seh. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
20. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). In Brandenburg, the Court was engaged in its taxonomic
jurisprudence of categorizing certain speech as falling outside the protection of the First
Amendment while other speech remained fully protected. In this regard, the Court had previously held that obscenity and fighting words, see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568 (1942), and defamatory remarks, see Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (citing
Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952)), remained unprotected by the First Amendment.
The Court's doctrine respecting these matters has evolved. In New York Times Co. v.
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Court announced that speech promoting violence would become unprotected under the First Amendment only if it is "directed [at] ...
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to ... produce such

[lawless] action.""
The sort of tight fit between means and ends is not present here.
Television violence cannot be shown to produce a likelihood of "imminent lawless action" in any particular individual. Thus, under our
system of free expression, the government's response to such expres-

sion cannot involve coerced silence of the sort envisioned by the
Hollings Bill. Rather, in a self-corrective marketplace of ideas, the
appropriate response must involve more speech to explain why the

original speech was offensive.
In this regard it does not matter, in First Amendment terms,
whether television violence has a general and inchoate adverse impact
upon children as well as adults. I would concede that there is too

much violence in our society. There may well be too much violence
on television. But the fact is that much expression is offensive. Much
expression has the capacity to provoke, in a general way, undesirable

consequences. Speeches about Communism in the 1930s or 1950s
might have provoked some disloyalty among some members of the
American population. Some religious speech has the capacity to exacerbate religious differences and to heighten national differences. Louis

Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Court "constitutionalized" the law of defamation. Under a
taxonomic approach toward the First Amendment, defamation might continue to be regarded
as unprotected by the First Amendment, but the Court's definition as to what would constitute actionable defamation-at least with respect to public officials-was significantly modified. Similarly, in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976), the Court found commercial speech to be protected by the F'rst
Amendment, notwithstanding earlier suggestions to the contrary. See Valentine v. Chrestensen,
316 U.S. 52 (1942). However even then, commercial speech remained subject to different
First Amendment standards. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
In Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), the Court first introduced the "clear
and present danger" test in deciding whether certain forms of political advocacy were or were
not entitled to First Amendment protection. The Brandenburg standard is simply a modem
formulation of that approach. So understood, Brandenburg is a tool for deciding whether
expression is or is not protected by the First Amendment. It is not a case in which the
Court was applying a requirement of "narrowly tailoring" under what has come to be described as "strict judicial scrutiny." See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 TermForward; In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). Nevertheless, the Brandenburg opinion provides a
powerful example of the Court's hostility to laws that would suppress expression on the basis
of a loose nexus between the expression and undesirable yet anticipated consequences.
21. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
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Farrakhan's speeches may well provoke racial tensions and promote
anti-Semitism.
These examples only demonstrate the power of expression. And
those of us who believe in the importance of the First Amendment
and believe in free speech cannot deny that speech is a powerful
medium. But, if the capacity of speech to influence people in unspecific yet undesired ways becomes the basis for censorship, then we
might as well abandon the First Amendment and allow government to
decide what speech is good for us and what speech is not.
In the end, the First Amendment was intended to prohibit government from doing just that. And at bottom, the Hollings Bill invites
two questions as a matter of constitutional doctrine as well as a matter of common sense. First, what is violent speech? And, second, who
does Senator Hollings trust to make that decision? Senator Hollings
can provide no constitutionally acceptable answer to these questions.
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